[2866] 21742/P7 100 pads 2/26 754 G & S 128
SECRET.
COPY OF TELEGRAM.
From C-in-C.China.
To-Admiralty.
(19)+(25)
DATE 31.3.27
SENT 1110
RECD. 1631
IN
State
@ypher G.E,(0-in-C).
923. Addressed to admiralty repeated to British Minister
Peking.
Your 655 Your 658 Your 659 while I agree that forcible
measures must be taken if necesary to enforce ultima tum
this is tantamount to war and I cannot concur as to
feasibility of your proposals.. Reference to your 655 (a)
interruption of troop movements and stoppage of Chinese
traffic on Yungtse amounts to internal blockade and cannot
be effected without engaging forts. Any co-operation by
other Powers is improbable until their nationals have been
evacuated from the Yangtse. any ?(direct) laterference with
operations by Southern Forces against Nort.. will not be to
our advantage. I strongly advise that if oroible action is
taken it should be in the form of a definite operution
against definite points. It should bring us some concrete
advantage. Its successful achievement must be quick rather
than protracted and when completed such that it cannot be
denied or misrepresented to the world by propagandu-ists.
suggest (A) The seizure of Wusung Forts including Shihtzulin.
(B) The seizure or neutralization of Chinese Navəl Forces.
This will entail employment of severul of H.M.Ships. Both
these are advantageous to Foreign Powers. Forts oun ve
destroyed before they are vacuated. In the case of wusung it will add greatly to security of shipping entering Wusung
which may become a vital point as regards food supply. After
consultation with General Duncan we recommend ultimatum
should include at Shanghai the withdrawal of all Chinese
armed forces other than police from the area within a
I
No comments yet.
Private notes are available after approval.